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HEALTHCARE FOR ALL: ENSURING STATES 
COMPLY WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
RIGHTS OF LEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Abstract: Noncitizens lawfully residing in the United States are consid-
ered a “discrete and insular minority” in equal protection jurisprudence. 
Foreclosed from meaningful political participation because of an inability 
to vote, this population is frequently the target of budget cuts in an eco-
nomic downturn when legislators struggle to preserve benefits for their 
voting constituents. Recently, Massachusetts and New Jersey dealt with 
looming deficits by eliminating many legal permanent residents’ eligibil-
ity for state-funded health insurance programs. Each state relied on provi-
sions in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act, federal legislation that purports to allow individual states to 
discriminate against legal immigrants in state-funded social welfare pro-
grams. This Note concludes that states like Massachusetts and New Jersey 
cannot adopt a federal classification scheme excluding newly arrived legal 
immigrants from their respective state-funded healthcare programs with-
out running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. First, Massachusetts 
and New Jersey’s state-funded healthcare programs are unrelated to, and 
thus not justified by, federal immigration policy. Second, federal legisla-
tion cannot authorize individual states to circumvent strict scrutiny review 
by the courts. Moreover, it is economically unwise for a state to exclude its 
“citizens in waiting” from cost-effective, accessible healthcare, despite the 
federal government’s decision to do so. 
Introduction 
 In 2006, Massachusetts passed An Act Providing Access to Afford-
able, Quality and Accountable Healthcare, becoming the first state to 
insure nearly all its residents.1 Despite this landmark legislation, the 
recession has recently forced the state to retreat from its ambitious goal 
of universal coverage.2 On September 1, 2009, the Massachusetts legis-
lature, facing an insurmountable budget shortfall, eliminated legal 
                                                                                                                      
1 See An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality and Accountable Healthcare, 2006 
Mass. Acts 111–202 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M, §§ 1–5 (2006)). 
2 See Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Takes a Step Back from Health Care for All, N.Y. 
Times, July 15, 2009, at A10. 
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permanent residents3 from its comprehensive Commonwealth Care 
program.4 Instead, Massachusetts now offers this population a basic 
plan for a third of the cost.5 Eugenio Hernandez, a tax paying, low-
income worker, is among the thirty thousand Massachusetts residents 
who lost Commonwealth Care coverage.6 Through Commonwealth 
Care, Hernandez received frequent radiation treatments for his pros-
tate cancer, and was in recovery as of 2009.7 His new health plan, Celti-
Care, charges substantially higher co-pays and premiums, yet offers lim-
ited services.8 If his cancer returns, Hernandez’s new insurance plan 
may not cover all of his necessary treatments, and he will have to find 
new doctors and pay substantially higher co-pays for covered services.9 
Although CeltiCare now covers legal immigrants like Hernandez who 
previously received Commonwealth Care, individuals who were not en-
rolled in the program as of September 2009 are entirely ineligible for 
subsidized health insurance in Massachusetts.10 Despite losing access to 
comprehensive state coverage, legal immigrants remain subject to the 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006). 
The term “legal permanent resident” refers to noncitizens permitted to remain perma-
nently in the United States, as distinguished from “nonimmigrants,” defined as noncitizens 
permitted to reside temporarily in the United States for a specific purpose. See id. 
§ 1101(a)(15). Additionally, “unlawful” or “undocumented” immigrants are defined as 
individuals who entered the United States without inspection or remained in the United 
States after the expiration of a visa, and have neither temporary nor permanent residence 
authorization. See id. Throughout this Note, “legal immigrant” and “lawful immigrant” 
both refer to noncitizens that are authorized to remain permanently in the United States. 
See id. § 1101(a)(20). 
4 See Act of Aug. 7, 2009, 2009 Mass. Acts 695. The Act declares that “notwithstanding 
any general or special law to the contrary, an eligible individual pursuant to section 3 of 
chapter 118H of the General Laws shall not include persons who cannot receive federally-
funded benefits.” Id. Individuals who have held legal permanent resident status for five 
years or more are eligible for the Commonwealth Care program. Id. For a discussion of 
federal immigrant eligibility guidelines, see infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. For 
an overview of the Commonwealth Care program, see infra notes 201–211 and accompany-
ing text. 
5 See Memorandum from Melissa Boudreault, Dir., Commonwealth Connector, to Dirs. 
of Commonwealth Care Bd., Update on Legal Immigrant Program 1 (Sept. 5, 2009) (on 
file with author). 
6 Kay Lazar & Maria Sacchetti, Immigrant Fighting Cancer and the Fear of Losing Care, Bos. 
Globe, July 15, 2009, at B1. 
7 See id. 
8 See Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Cuts Back Immigrants’ Health Care, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 1, 2009, at A17. 
9 See id. 
10 See Act of Aug. 7, 2009, 2009 Mass. Acts 695; see also Complaint at 1, Finch v. Com-
monwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., No. SJ-2010–0103 (Mass. filed Feb. 25, 2010) 
[hereinafter Massachusetts Complaint] (estimating that at least eight thousand legal im-
migrants are left without any form of healthcare). 
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individual healthcare mandate.11 If an individual is uninsured, the indi-
vidual must affirmatively apply for a hardship waiver to avoid substan-
tial tax penalties.12 Thirty thousand legal immigrants, who pay taxes 
that fund the Commonwealth Care program, and who remain subject 
to the individual healthcare mandate, are now foreclosed from partici-
pation in the program.13 
 When asked by a reporter why legal immigrants were the targets of 
healthcare cuts in Massachusetts, State Representative Robert DeLeo 
replied that “there is only so much money that we have.”14 Massachu-
setts is not the only state to balance its budget at the expense of non-
citizen residents: on March 31, 2010, New Jersey similarly de-enrolled 
twelve thousand newly arrived legal permanent residents from its state-
funded medical assistance program.15 Legal immigrants pay taxes, serve 
in the military, and participate in important civic functions, yet their 
inability to vote limits meaningful political participation.16 Therefore, 
this population is uniquely vulnerable to budget cuts in government 
programs at both the state and federal levels.17 Although the recently 
enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act significantly 
expanded Medicaid coverage for lower income U.S. citizens, legal 
permanent residents remain ineligible for Medicaid for their first five 
years in status.18 Individual states like Massachusetts and New Jersey, 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M, § 1(1) (2006) (including legal immigrants in the 
definition of residents subjected to the mandate); id. § 2(a), (b) (imposing tax penalties 
on Massachusetts residents who do not obtain individual health insurance coverage). 
12 See id. §§ 1(1), 2(a). 
13 See id. § 2(a) (subjecting legal immigrants to the individual mandate); 2009 Mass. 
Acts 695 (excluding legal immigrants from the Commonwealth Care program). 
14 See Goodnough, supra note 2. 
15 See N.J. Admin. Code § 10:78-3.2(e)(1) (2010) (terminating FamilyCare eligibility for 
legal permanent residents who are in status for less than five years); Medicaid Communica-
tion No. 10-01 from John R. Guhl, Dir., N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Med. 
Assistance & Health Servs., to Cnty. Welfare Agency Dirs. 1 (Mar. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/medicaid/2010/10-01_Pro- 
gram_Changes_For_NJ_FamilyCare_Parents_Caretakers.pdf (citing the “unprecedented 
financial crisis” as the reason for terminating legal permanent residents from the program). 
16 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (citing Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. 
Supp. 250, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1970)) (noting that legal immigrants participate in meaningful 
civic duties and pay taxes, but cannot vote). 
17 See id. 
18 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2001(a), 124 Stat. 119, 271 (expanding Medicaid coverage for adults and families whose 
income is at or below 133% of the poverty level, and declining to repeal restrictions on 
legal immigrant participation); see also Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., How Are Immi-
grants Included in Health Care Reform? 1 (2010), available at http://www.nilc.org/ 
immspbs/health/immigrant-inclusion-in-HR3590-2010-04-19.pdf (commenting that legal 
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facing looming budget deficits, often target legal immigrants for cuts in 
programs and services to safeguard government benefits for their vot-
ing constituents.19 For this reason, the courts play a vital role in deter-
mining whether legislation that targets legal immigrants violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.20 
 On February 25, 2010, Health Law Advocates filed a class action 
lawsuit on behalf of legal immigrants in Massachusetts, asserting that 
the legislature’s restriction on their participation in Commonwealth 
Care violated both the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions.21 Specifi-
cally, the complaint alleges that the Commonwealth’s actions violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by “invidi-
ously treating [legal immigrants] differently than citizens similarly situ-
ated solely on account of their status as legal aliens.”22 On September 1, 
2010, the Center for Social Justice at Seton Hall Law School filed a class 
action lawsuit in New Jersey and similarly asserted that de-enrolling le-
gal permanent residents from the state’s FamilyCare program “improp-
erly, and without justification, single[s] out Class Members for disparate 
treatment on the basis of their alienage and immigration status in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.”23 
 This Note asserts that individual states like Massachusetts and New 
Jersey cannot and should not exclude legal immigrants from state-
subsidized healthcare programs.24 Discrimination against lawfully pre-
sent immigrants in state programs contravenes the spirit of the Four-
                                                                                                                      
immigrants may purchase insurance through exchanges, but remain ineligible for Medi-
caid under previous restrictions). For a more detailed discussion of recent federal legisla-
tion, see infra notes 219–234 and accompanying text. 
19 See Goodnough, supra note 2. 
20 See infra notes 250–331 and accompanying text. 
21 See Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. The complaint was filed in the Su-
preme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, the single justice session of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court. See id. Defendants sought to have the case removed to federal 
court, and plaintiffs amended their complaint to excise the federal question and to re-
mand the case back to the Supreme Judicial Court. See Plaintiff’s Updated Motion to Re-
serve Ruling and Report this Matter to the Full Court at 1, Finch v. Commonwealth Health 
Ins. Connector Auth., No. SJ-2010–0103 (Mass. filed June 8, 2010). Oral arguments were 
heard in the case before the full Supreme Judicial Court on November 1, 2010, and the 
case is currently pending a determination as to whether the challenged legislation de-
prives plaintiffs of equal protection under Massachusetts law. See id. 
22 See Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 10, at 13. 
23 See Verified Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
at 25, Guaman v. Velez, No. L-1608-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. filed Sept. 1, 2010) [here-
inafter New Jersey Complaint]. 
24 See infra notes 250–346 and accompanying text. 
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teenth Amendment and violates the Equal Protection Clause.25 From a 
policy perspective, foreclosing participation in subsidized healthcare to 
a population that is, by definition, permanently residing in the United 
States only shifts expenditures from cost-effective, cost-controlled pre-
ventive care to expensive emergency room treatment.26 Federal law 
mandates that all hospitals treat patients with an emergency medical 
condition, regardless of their ability to pay.27 As a result, immigrant re-
strictions in state healthcare programs—enacted to reduce costs—in 
fact increase the costs absorbed by states and hospitals in treating legal 
immigrants.28 
 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act (the “PRA”) curtailed immigrant eligibility for most fed-
eral benefits, including the jointly funded federal-state Medicaid pro-
gram.29 Equal protection challenges to the PRA’s immigrant restrictions 
in federally funded programs have been largely unsuccessful, as the 
judiciary accords broad deference to federal immigration-related legis-
lation.30 Conversely, individual states cannot prohibit participation in 
state-funded health programs by noncitizens lawfully residing within 
state borders because individual states are not empowered to regulate 
immigration.31 Legal immigrants constitute a suspect class, and state 
legislation that discriminates against this population is closely scruti-
nized by the courts.32 
 Through the PRA, Congress attempted to delegate its authority to 
enact immigrant restrictions to the states so that states could exclude 
legal immigrants from their respective benefit programs.33 Despite statu-
tory authorization, Congress cannot delegate its broad power to regu-
late immigration to individual states, and immigration restrictions in 
state-funded benefit programs violate the Equal Protection Clause.34 A 
                                                                                                                      
25 See infra notes 250–331 and accompanying text. 
26 See Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Comprehensive Health Care Reform for Immi-
grants: A Sound Strategy for Fiscal and Public Health 1 (2004), available at http:// 
www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/Issue_Briefs/comphealthcare_0404.pdf. 
27 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (2006). 
28 See id. 
29 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
30 See infra notes 172–178 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 179–193 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text. 
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2006). 
34 See infra notes 262–331 and accompanying text. 
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unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1971, Graham v. Richardson, 
held that “Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual 
states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”35 Graham survives congres-
sional attempts to insulate state-funded programs from equal protection 
challenges brought by legal immigrants seeking access to government 
benefits.36 Although courts diverge as to whether jointly funded federal-
state programs, like Medicaid, can adopt the PRA’s immigrant restric-
tions, independent, state-funded programs remain subject to Graham.37 
Therefore, Massachusetts and New Jersey violated the equal protection 
rights of legal immigrant residents by denying them access to their re-
spective state-funded Commonwealth Care and FamilyCare programs.38 
As states fill remaining healthcare coverage gaps in the wake of national 
reform, they must provide coverage to citizens and lawful immigrants on 
equal terms.39 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of government healthcare 
programs and legislation restricting immigrants’ access to these pro-
grams.40 It then outlines the development of equal protection jurispru-
dence regarding federal and state programs that condition eligibility 
upon immigration status, and reviews recent state and federal devel-
opments in healthcare legislation.41 Part II asserts that state legislation 
that forecloses legal immigrants from state-funded healthcare programs 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, and creates bad public policy.42 
I. The Road to Exclusion: Subsidized Healthcare, Welfare 
Reform, and the State-Federal Distinction 
 This Part begins with an overview of government healthcare pro-
grams at the state and federal levels,43 including the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) treatment mandate.44 
Next, Section B summarizes relevant provisions of the 1996 Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which signifi-
cantly curtailed immigrant benefits eligibility and delegated to the states 
                                                                                                                      
35 See 403 U.S. at 382. 
36 See id. 
37 See id.; infra notes 262–294 and accompanying text. 
38 See Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 10, at 1; New Jersey Complaint, supra note 
23, at 25. 
39 See infra notes 235–346 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 48–110 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 111–234 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 235–346 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 48–74 and accompanying text, 
44 See infra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
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the authority to impose parallel restrictions in state-funded programs.45 
Third, Section C outlines the development of equal protection jurispru-
dence in state and federal courts, focusing on the appropriate standard 
of review for both federal and state programs that exclude legal residents 
based on their immigration status.46 Finally, Section D provides a brief 
overview of the Massachusetts model, which until recently included all 
income-eligible legal immigrants in its supplemental coverage.47 
A. Covering the Needy: The Medicaid Program and the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act 
1. Medicaid and Medicare 
 Congress created the Medicaid and Medicare programs in the So-
cial Security Amendments of 1965.48 The Medicaid program replaced 
prior patchwork federal grants to states that provided medical care for 
welfare recipients and the aged; it was also intended to fill the gap 
more comprehensively in care for low-income individuals who were not 
covered through employer-based insurance.49 The Medicare program 
provides health coverage based upon old age or permanent disability.50 
Generally, to be eligible for Medicare, an individual must pay Social 
Security and Medicare taxes for a minimum of ten years.51 This provi-
sion effectively excludes many immigrants from coverage, as it imposes 
a de facto durational residency requirement.52 Medicare is adminis-
                                                                                                                      
45 See infra notes 75–110 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 111–200 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 201–218 and accompanying text. Although both Massachusetts and 
New Jersey’s healthcare programs are being challenged by legal immigrants facing termi-
nation of coverage, New Jersey’s program has always been more limited in scope. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 30:4J-12 (West 2008) (setting forth limited circumstances in which supple-
mental health coverage is available). Therefore, this Note focuses on the “Massachusetts 
Model” of health reform, which offers a more comprehensive blueprint for other states to 
follow. See infra notes 201–218. 
48 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 
343–52 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing a Medicaid 
program and enumerating eligibility, requirements, and responsibilities of states and fed-
eral government); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395j (2006). 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
50 See id. §§ 1395–1395b-1. 
51 See id. §§ 413–414 (2006). Although there are some exceptions, most Medicare re-
cipients must meet this requirement, thereby earning sufficient credits for coverage. See id. 
52 See id. 
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tered and funded by the federal government and primarily serves U.S. 
citizens and long-term permanent residents.53 
 The Medicaid program is a partnership between the federal gov-
ernment and individual states.54 The federal government provides a 
significant subsidy to participating states, thus enabling the states to 
provide healthcare coverage to income-eligible residents.55 The federal 
government determines which healthcare services states must provide 
to their participants56 and mandates a baseline set of eligibility guide-
lines for participating individuals.57 The participant state then promul-
gates its own regulations which may supplement the federally-
proscribed minimum guidelines.58 States may provide supplemental 
coverage for certain populations or include additional types of medical 
treatment and care.59 As long as the state provides the minimum feder-
ally mandated services, the state is permitted to receive matching fund-
ing for these variations in services and eligibility criteria.60 As a result, 
the Medicaid program is not a uniform program with consistent ser-
vices and eligibility requirements across the nation: instead, it resem-
bles a series of state medical coverage programs that loosely conform to 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. Medicare will not be discussed at length in this Note. Because it is adminis-
tered, regulated, and funded by the federal government, reviewing courts will invoke a 
rational basis standard of review when immigration restrictions in the program are chal-
lenged. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). Medicare eligibility focuses on “qualify-
ing quarters” of Social Security coverage: an individual earns a quarter when the individual 
earns a certain amount within three months and pays Social Security and Medicare taxes 
on that income. See 42 U.S.C. § 413. Because Medicare requires that an individual earn a 
minimum of forty “qualifying quarters,” immigration status is only a secondary considera-
tion. See id. § 414. By definition, newly-arrived immigrants are ineligible for the program 
because they have not earned sufficient qualifying quarters. See id. 
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1)–(17). 
55 See id. 
56 Id. § 1396d(a) (enumerating mandatory benefits that states must provide to their 
residents). 
57 Id. § 1396d(a)(10) (defining broad categories of individuals who are either eligible 
or ineligible for benefits according to federal guidelines, such as individuals receiving Sup-
plemental Security Income). 
58 See id. § 1396c. 
59 Id. § 1396d(a). States are permitted to provide optional services, like targeted case 
management and additional maternity care services, beyond the minimum federal re-
quirements. Id § 1396d(a)(1)–(17). States are also permitted to expand the pool of eligi-
ble residents (non-immigration-related) beyond the federal minimum. Id § 1396d(a)(i)–
(xiii). For example, a state can offer Medicaid to the “medically needy”—persons whose 
income may be higher than the limit for Medicaid eligibility, but who have extraordinarily 
high monthly medical expenses that, if deducted from their gross income, render them 
income-eligible. Id. 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. 
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broad federal guidelines.61 Therefore, the scope and quality of services 
that an individual receives, and whether the individual may receive 
those services at all, largely depends on the state of residence.62 
2. Emergency Care: The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act 
 Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986.63 EMTALA ensures that any 
individual, regardless of insurance coverage, ability to pay, or immigra-
tion status, can receive emergency medical treatment, including medi-
cal attention while in labor.64 Hospitals that operate emergency rooms 
are required to comply with EMTALA to receive federal funding and 
therefore must treat anyone with a health emergency.65 Medicaid reim-
burses hospitals for emergency treatment in accordance with EMTALA, 
but the statutory definition of “emergency” is vague, and emergency 
room staff must make immediate decisions on patient admission.66 
Medicaid does not reimburse hospitals for “non-emergency” treatment, 
leaving hospitals, municipalities and states to absorb the costs.67 Hospi-
tals face fines of up to fifty thousand dollars per patient, however, if an 
individual with a medical emergency is refused treatment.68 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Jon Donenberg, Note, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State Com-
pliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 Yale L.J. 1498, 1504–05 (2008). 
62 David M. Herszenhorn, Medicaid Expansion Poses Test for Some Democrats, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 14, 2009, at A23. Eligibility criteria for Medicaid services vary significantly from state 
to state. Id. In Alabama, for example, the maximum qualifying household income is 12% 
of the federal poverty level, whereas in Minnesota, it is 275% of the federal poverty level. 
Id. In addition to variations in eligibility criteria, there are significant differences in indi-
vidual states’ reimbursement schemes for Medicaid services. See Rosemary B. Guiltinan, 
Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medi-
caid Recipients’ Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1583, 1591–92 (2010) (describing dispari-
ties in reimbursement levels between states). 
63 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. IX, 
§ 9121(b) (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006)). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
65 See id. § 1395dd(b). 
66 See id. § 1395dd(e)(1), (h) (defining an emergency medical condition as a “medical 
condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in” risk to the health 
of the individual, serious impairment to bodily functions, and organ malfunction). 
67 See 42 C.F.R. § 430.25(g)(2) (2009) (exempting states from reimbursing hospitals 
for Medicaid-eligible recipients who receive nonemergency services in emergency rooms). 
For a discussion of the interplay between immigration and EMTALA, see infra notes 97–
104 and accompanying text. 
68 See 42 C.F.R. § 489.53(b) (2006) (setting penalties for failure to treat a patient in an 
emergency condition). Hospitals may also be civilly liable in tort for any injuries resulting 
from refusal to treat an individual with an emergency condition. See 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(d). 
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states, municipalities, and hospitals must accept patients with urgent 
medical needs and frequently absorb the costs of treating individuals 
who are either financially ineligible for Medicaid or whose immigration 
status places them outside the eligibility guidelines.69 Most low-income 
immigrants do not qualify for federally subsidized health insurance 
programs and often rely on the EMTALA mandate to receive medical 
treatment in an emergency.70 As a result, individual states must fund 
treatment for immigrants who are ineligible for Medicaid.71 The costs 
absorbed by states have exploded since 1996 when the PRA eliminated 
Medicaid eligibility for most legal immigrants, and the costs continue to 
rise: between 2000 and 2005, uncompensated emergency room care 
costs rose from $4 billion per year nationwide, to $25 billion per year.72 
Beginning in 2005, Congress appropriated $250 million per year to re-
imburse states for the increase in costs resulting from the PRA.73 Ac-
cording to estimates by the American Hospital Association, this figure 
represents only one percent of the total costs shouldered by hospitals 
and states under EMTALA.74 
B. Immigrants Need Not Apply: The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
1. Background and Major Provisions of the PRA 
 Prior to 1996, legal immigrants were eligible for Medicaid cover-
age in every state, as broad federal eligibility guidelines included all 
                                                                                                                      
When a hospital incorrectly determines that an individual arriving in the emergency room 
is not experiencing an “emergency” under the EMTALA definition, it faces fines of up to 
fifty thousand dollars per patient. See id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). 
69 See Adrianne Ortega, Note, . . . And Health Care for All: Immigrants in the Shadow of the 
Promise of Universal Health Care, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 185, 193–94 (2009). 
70 See Karyn Schwartz & Samantha Artiga, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Un-
insured, Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care for Low-Income Non-
Citizen Adults 2 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7651.pdf (in-
dicating that legal immigrants are far less likely to be eligible for employer-sponsored or state-
sponsored health coverage, and therefore often receive treatment for emergency care only). 
71 See Ortega, supra note 69, at 193–94. 
72 Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Underpayment by Medicare and Medicaid Fact Sheet 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2006/pdf/underpaymentfs2006.pdf. 
73 See Impacts of Border Security and Immigration on Ways and Means Programs: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 29–30 (2006) [hereinafter House Ways & 
Means Hearing] (statement of Thomas Gustafson, Deputy Director, U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services). 
74 See American Hospital Association, supra note 72, at 2. 
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legally present aliens.75 Additionally, the Social Security Amendments 
of 1972 provided an expansive definition of legally present immigrants 
by creating a legislative category of persons “permanently residing un-
der color of law” (“PRUCOL”), which included individuals who were 
not affirmatively granted legal status but whose departure the then-
Immigration and Naturalization Service did not contemplate enforc-
ing.76 Under this definition, a majority of indigent immigrants qualified 
for subsidized coverage in some capacity.77 
 The PRA signaled a significant departure from permissive federal 
Medicaid guidelines.78 Title IV of the PRA severely curtailed nonciti-
zens’ eligibility for needs-based benefits, including Medicaid.79 To jus-
tify this paradigm shift, Congress invoked the sweeping powers of the 
federal government to regulate immigration, emphasizing that immi-
grants are motivated by the availability of public benefits.80 The part of 
the bill codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1601 links public benefits to border con-
trol and replaces the pre-1996 statutes with more restrictive eligibility 
guidelines.81 Congress laments in § 1601 that “[d]espite the principle of 
self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for and receiving public 
benefits from Federal, State and local governments at increasing rates,” 
and that “current eligibility rules . . . have proved wholly incapable of 
assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.”82 
The PRA eliminated permissive immigration categories; the PRUCOL 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614, 86 Stat. 1329, 1471, repealed by Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105 (allowing all legally present immigrants access to Medicaid benefits). 
76 See Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien Eligibility for 
Public Benefits, 14 Nova L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (1990) (citing 86 Stat. at 1471). PRUCOL is a 
legislatively created category, not an immigrant status, created for the purpose of provid-
ing benefits to immigrants who are not being deported any time soon. See id. at 1043. This 
category was eliminated in the 1996 PRA, but still exists in some state benefits programs. 
See, e.g., 18 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 18, § 349.3(2)(b)(iv) (2008) (qualifying per-
sons residing under color of law for New York’s state-funded benefits programs). 
77 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1034, 1043 (reasoning that the PRUCOL category was 
construed broadly by the states and therefore included all legal immigrants and many 
undocumented immigrants). 
78 See 110 Stat. at 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
79 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1611–1613, 1621–1622, 1641 (2006). 
80 See id. § 1601(2)(A) (stating that the PRA’s immigrant restrictions are important for 
fostering self-sufficiency, and that immigrants “within the nation’s borders [cannot] de-
pend on public resources to meet their needs”); id. § 1601(2)(B) (stating that a priority of 
the Act is to ensure that “the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for 
immigration to the United States”). 
81 See id. § 1601(2)(B). 
82 See id. § 1601(3), (4). 
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category vanished from the eligibility guidelines altogether.83 Further-
more, the PRA restricted the receipt of most federal means-tested bene-
fits for almost all noncitizens.84 As a result, legal permanent residents 
were barred from receiving Supplemental Security Income and were 
ineligible for any other means-tested benefit for their first five years in 
legal resident status (the “five-year bar”).85 
 The PRA took the unprecedented step of extending these immi-
gration restrictions to individual states, reasoning that states receive 
federal funding for programs like Medicaid.86 Moreover, in a controver-
sial provision, the PRA authorized states to restrict the participation of 
noncitizens in independent, state-funded benefits programs wholly un-
related to federal entitlements.87 In doing so, the PRA attempted to 
undo the previous jurisprudential distinction between federal immigra-
tion-related legislation and parallel state legislation.88 The statute reads, 
“a State is authorized to determine the eligibility for any State public 
benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien,” thereby granting a state 
discretion to bar all noncitizens from receiving benefits under its pro-
grams.89 
 This delegation of authority from Congress to the states attempts 
to insulate the states from the strict scrutiny review traditionally em-
ployed by the courts.90 The statute declares that a state that adopts the 
federal restrictions in its own state-funded program presumptively satis-
fies strict scrutiny because the state “shall be considered to have chosen 
the least restrictive means for achieving the compelling government interest of 
assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigra-
tion policy.”91 This language adopts the terminology of the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
83 See id. § 1641(a)–(c). 
84 See id. §§ 1611–1613. The PRA separates noncitizens into two categories: qualified 
and unqualified aliens. See id. § 1641. Qualified aliens include legal permanent residents, 
refugees, asylees, and Cuban or Haitian entrants. Id. § 1641(b). Unqualified aliens are all 
nonimmigrants, persons residing under color of law, and individuals with pending applica-
tions for legal status; essentially, all immigration categories omitted from the “qualified 
alien” definitions. See id. § 1611(a) (prohibiting any alien not “qualified” under the Act 
from receiving benefits). 
85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a). 
86 See id. § 1621(a). 
87 See id. § 1622(a). 
88 See id.; infra notes 168–200 and accompanying text. 
89 See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a). 
90 See id. § 1601(7); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the 
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 512–13 (2001) 
(noting that the PRA attempted to shield individual state benefits legislation from tradi-
tional strict scrutiny review by the courts). 
91 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (emphasis added). 
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Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and places the state’s immigra-
tion legislation under the umbrella of the federal plenary power to 
regulate immigration.92 Therefore, the PRA takes the unprecedented 
step of attempting to delegate congressional plenary power over immi-
gration to the states.93 Through this delegation, the PRA attempts to 
shield state restrictions on noncitizens from traditional strict scrutiny 
review.94 Additionally, the PRA does not allow a state to provide nonciti-
zens greater access to solely state-funded benefits programs unless that 
state affirmatively enacted legislation to that effect after the passage of 
the PRA.95 Therefore, the PRA declares most noncitizens ineligible for 
federal, state, and local benefits, and places the burden of preserving 
immigrant eligibility for state-funded benefits on state legislatures.96 
2. Intersection of the PRA with Existing Federal and State Programs 
 The PRA drastically reduced the number of individuals eligible for 
Medicaid and attempted to authorize similar restrictions in state-
funded healthcare programs.97 Meanwhile, EMTALA, enacted in 1986, 
continued to require hospitals to treat individuals facing medical 
emergencies regardless of their ability to pay, their immigration status, 
or whether the hospital could receive reimbursement for services that 
went beyond simply stabilizing the patient’s medical emergency.98 Al-
though the federal mandate remained intact, the percentage of pa-
tients for whom a hospital could receive reimbursement diminished 
appreciably.99 Reimbursement for emergency treatment was premised 
upon whether a patient was Medicaid eligible in the particular state.100 
Under the PRA, however, states were prohibited from providing ser-
vices to “unqualified” aliens and were permitted to further restrict alien 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
93 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7). 
94 See id.; Wishnie, supra note 90, at 512–13. 
95 8 U.S.C. § 1621(3)(d) (“A State may provide that [a legal immigrant] is eligible for 
any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under 
subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a state law after August 22, 1996, 
which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”) (emphasis added). 
96 See id. 
97 See id. §§ 1611–1613, 1622. 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1) (2006). 
99 See Ryan Knutson, Note, Deprivation of Care: Are the Federal Laws Restricting the Provision 
of Medical Care to Immigrants Working as Planned?, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 401, 404–05 
(2008) (stating that the passage of the PRA imposed significant economic hardships on 
hospitals and emergency rooms). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a), (b) (2006) (setting mandatory guidelines for states partici-
pating in Medicaid, but permitting wide variation in services and eligibility criteria). 
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eligibility for Medicaid beyond the federal guidelines.101 Therefore, the 
pool of patients for whom hospitals could be reimbursed grew even 
smaller as states enacted additional immigrant restrictions.102 Begin-
ning in 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services au-
thorized modest annual reimbursements both to individual states and 
to hospitals for the cost of treating patients under the EMTALA man-
date who were not eligible for Medicaid.103 These appropriations, how-
ever, cover a small fraction of the actual costs incurred by hospitals and 
states under the EMTALA mandate.104 
 In the years immediately following the PRA’s enactment, states were 
flush with budget surpluses.105 Most states adopted the federal guide-
lines and allowed limited access to benefits for qualified aliens who met 
enumerated residency requirements, though few states eliminated non-
citizens’ eligibility for benefits altogether.106 States promulgated regula-
tions for their Medicaid programs that followed the guidelines of the 
PRA.107 Some states enacted affirmative legislation that created supple-
mental health insurance programs for certain categories of immigrants, 
although in some cases the breadth of services available to eligible im-
migrants, as well as the categories of eligible immigrants, were less com-
prehensive than the pre-PRA federal Medicaid provisions.108 Still, in the 
                                                                                                                      
101 See id. §§ 1621(a), 1622(a) (2006); Wishnie, supra note 90, at 567 (listing states that 
decided to enact additional restrictions on noncitizens in state welfare programs). 
102 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a), 1622(a); Wishnie, supra note 90, at 567. 
103 See House Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 73, at 29–30 (statement of Thomas 
Gustafson, Deputy Director, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services). 
104 See American Hospital Association, supra note 72, at 2. 
105 See Wishnie, supra note 90, at 498 n.25. 
106 See id. at 495 n.9, 497 n.24. Only five states, immediately following passage of the PRA, 
tried to terminate eligibility of all noncitizens for Medicaid: Alabama, Louisiana, Pennsyl-
vania, Wyoming, and initially, New York. See id. at 497 n.24. Other states enacted more oner-
ous eligibility requirements for noncitizens, including waiting periods of up to one year. Id. at 
495 n.9. In 2005, Colorado terminated Medicaid eligibility for all noncitizens. See Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004). Interestingly, the PRA requires states to 
cover otherwise-eligible asylees and refugees for seven years but also requires states to termi-
nate asylee and refugee eligibility after seven years. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(b), 1622(b) (2006). 
107 See Shawn Fremstad & Laura Cox, Kaiser Comm’n On Medicaid & the Unin-
sured, Covering New Americans: A Review of Federal and State Policies Related To 
Immigrants’ Eligibility and Access To Publicly Funded Health Insurance 18 (2004), 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Covering-New-Americans-A-Review-of- 
Federal-and-State-Policies-Related-to-Immigrants-Eligibility-and-Access-to-Publicly-Funded-
Health-Insurance-Report.pdf. 
108 See id. at ii, 18. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, and Washington, D.C. cover 
all income-eligible children regardless of immigration status; thirteen states provide prena-
tal care regardless of immigration status. Id. at 17. Additionally, a handful of states provide 
a limited form of care to PRUCOLs. See id. 
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midst of any economic instability, as evidenced by the recent recession, 
state-subsidized programs for legal immigrants are the first to be cut 
from state budgets.109 Therefore, the recession prompts a reexamina-
tion of the PRA’s true impact: states that were previously generous to 
immigrants in their state-funded programs are now eliminating cover-
age for this demographic.110 
C. Equal Protection Challenges to Immigration Restrictions: Federal Plenary 
Power, State Strict Scrutiny, and Post-PRA Decisions 
1. Overview of Divergent Standards of Review 
 Prior to the PRA, the U.S. Supreme Court examined federal legis-
lation that restricts immigrant access to benefits differently from paral-
lel state provisions.111 The Court accorded broad discretion to federal 
legislation, using a rational basis standard of review for evaluating the 
equal protection claims of immigrants.112 The rational basis standard of 
review requires only that the challenged statute or regulation relate to a 
legitimate governmental interest to survive an equal protection chal-
lenge.113 The Court recognizes that provisions of federal benefits law 
that classify eligibility by immigration status are discriminatory.114 Not-
withstanding the discriminatory nature of such classifications, the 
Court understands the federal government’s interest in controlling 
immigration to override the equal protection rights of immigrants.115 
 Generally, when a statute or regulation targets a “suspect class” or 
discrete and insular minority, the reviewing court examines the chal-
lenged statute or regulation more closely.116 To pass constitutional mus-
                                                                                                                      
109 See id. at 18; see also Goodnough, supra note 8. In both Massachusetts and New Jer-
sey, noncitizens were the first to lose healthcare coverage in the recession. See Act of Aug. 
7, 2009, 2009 Mass. Acts 695; N.J. Admin. Code § 10:78-3.2(e)(1) (2010). 
110 See Fremstad & Cox, supra note 107, at 18. 
111 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82; Wishnie, supra note 90, at 496. For a discussion of the 
post-PRA regime, see infra notes 168–200 and accompanying text. 
112 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82. 
113 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (reasoning 
that different levels of judicial scrutiny shall apply in different contexts). 
114 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81; see also Wishnie, supra note 90, at 496. 
115 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81. 
116 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72 (reasoning that aliens are a discrete and insular mi-
nority or “suspect class” that warrant special protections under the laws because nonciti-
zens possess an immutable trait, share a history of discrimination, and are politically vul-
nerable because they are unable to vote); see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 
(1978) (echoing Graham in reasoning that noncitizens’ inability to vote deprives them of “a 
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ter, the government must prove that the statute or regulation is the 
least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental inter-
est.117 This more stringent standard applies to lawful immigrants chal-
lenging state legislation.118 The Court has consistently held that lawful 
immigrants are a suspect class because of their inability to vote and par-
ticipate in the political process.119 In theory, the Court applies a strict 
scrutiny standard of review when examining discriminatory legislation 
affecting legal immigrants.120 In contrast, when unlawfully present or 
undocumented immigrants challenge legislation, the Court employs 
either a rational basis or intermediate standard of review depending 
upon the interests at stake.121 These divergent standards of review re-
flect the Court’s recognition that lawfully present immigrants warrant 
greater protection than other noncitizen groups,122 largely because law-
fully present immigrants may remain permanently in the United States 
and thus shoulder important civic duties.123 Therefore, when there is 
an equal protection challenge to an immigration-related law, lawfully 
present immigrants, but not undocumented immigrants or temporarily 
present “nonimmigrants,” deserve review under the heightened strict 
scrutiny standard.124 Indeed, the outcome of these cases is often dic-
tated by the standard of review employed:125 the Court generally up-
holds a statute subject to a rational basis standard but strikes a statute 
                                                                                                                      
direct voice in the political process” and contributes to their classification as a suspect 
class); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. 
117 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (striking down a local ordinance 
that, in effect, discriminated against businesses owned by noncitizens). 
118 See id. 
119 See Foley, 435 U.S. at 294; Graham, 403 U.S. at 373. 
120 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
121 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (adopting an intermediate standard of scru-
tiny to invalidate a Texas statute denying public education to undocumented immigrant 
children). 
122 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371. 
123 See id. at 376; supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
124 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, 224–25. The role of undocumented immigrants in 
the debate over healthcare reform is significant. See Ortega, supra note 69, at 187 (address-
ing the role of undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform). Notwithstanding the 
importance of this issue, the jurisprudence concerning the equal protection rights of un-
documented immigrants is dissimilar to those of legal permanent residents, and the issue 
is therefore outside the scope of this Note. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–25. For a thoughtful 
analysis of the role of undocumented immigrants in the healthcare debate, see Ortega, 
supra note 69, at 193–94. 
125 See Wishnie, supra note 90, at 507 (positing that the judiciary has uniformly invali-
dated statutes reviewed with the strict scrutiny standard and validated statutes reviewed 
with the rational basis standard). 
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subject to a strict scrutiny standard absent a compelling showing by the 
government that such a statute is justified.126 
2. The Federal Immigration Power and Rational Basis Review 
 Despite the fact that lawful immigrants constitute a suspect class in 
equal protection challenges, federal legislation that discriminates 
against noncitizens in accessing government programs and economic 
entitlements has traditionally been upheld under a rational basis stan-
dard of review.127 In upholding discriminatory federal laws, the Court 
does not contend that these laws are any less invidious than their state 
counterparts; rather, the Court holds that the equal protection claims 
of immigrants are subverted by the federal government’s plenary 
power to regulate immigration.128 
 For over a century, the Court has championed the federal govern-
ment’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration.129 Although the 
power to regulate immigration is not specifically enumerated in the U.S. 
Constitution, the Court has recognized numerous textual sources that 
implicitly grant this power and has found additional, inherent sources 
from which this plenary power derives.130 Textual sources include the 
Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the treaty 
power.131 An important extra-textual source of the power is the unenu-
merated, sweeping doctrine of inherent national sovereignty.132 The 
Naturalization Clause grants Congress the authority “to establish a[n] 
uniform rule of naturalization.”133 The Court interprets this clause to 
apply to general immigration laws that regulate the admission and re-
moval of noncitizens within the United States, as well as laws that set cri-
teria for granting permanent resident status.134 The Foreign Commerce 
Clause, also enumerated in Article I, has been interpreted by the Court 
                                                                                                                      
126 See id. 
127 See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81. 
128 See id. at 80–81. 
129 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (initiating over a century of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence that supported expansive federal immigration powers). 
130 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603–04 (holding that the doctrine of inherent sov-
ereignty grants the federal government vast authority to regulate immigration, and simul-
taneously insulates its decisions from substantive constitutional challenge). 
131 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
132 See Wishnie, supra note 90, at 530. 
133 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
134 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (reasoning that a single comprehensive policy toward 
the treatment of aliens is a fundamental objective of the federal government). 
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to include congressional authority over persons who enter the United 
States.135 Furthermore, the treaty power, vested in the federal govern-
ment alone, underscores Congress’s exclusive domain over relations 
with foreign nations.136 
 For a brief period in the nation’s history, the states were permitted 
to apply their own naturalization requirements under the Articles of 
Confederation, which led to disastrous results.137 There is a consensus 
among scholars that the Framers granted exclusive immigration and 
foreign affairs powers to the federal government to encourage a na-
tional, uniform immigration law.138 Therefore, the textual delegation 
represented a direct and purposeful choice to remove any immigration 
policy powers from the states.139 In addition to the textual sources for 
federal immigration power, the Court has advanced the doctrine of in-
herent sovereign authority as a source of that power for over a cen-
tury.140 
 The combination of textual authority and the judicial doctrine of 
inherent sovereign authority creates a potent federal immigration power 
that is largely insulated from judicial oversight.141 This doctrine of in-
herent sovereign authority originated in the late nineteenth century, 
when Chinese-Americans, who were denied the right to naturalize, chal-
lenged their arbitrary exclusion and removal from the United States.142 
The plaintiffs lost their claims: the Supreme Court essentially declared 
federal immigration laws to be nonjusticiable.143 Many scholars criticize 
this doctrine as a Plessy-era aberration that legitimized racist and xeno-
phobic immigration laws that conflict with basic constitutional princi-
                                                                                                                      
135 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712 (recognizing 
Congress’s power over the “bringing of persons into the ports of the United States”). 
136 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties or 
entering into any agreements with a foreign power). 
137 See Wishnie, supra note 90 at 534–35 (commenting on the Framers’ awareness of 
the failures of state-regulated immigration). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603–04 (creating the 
doctrine of inherent sovereign authority pertaining to federal laws regulating immigra-
tion). First introduced as an unfortunate emblem of bigotry, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States declared that “[t]he power of the legislative department of 
the government to exclude aliens from the United States is an incident of sovereignty 
. . . .” 130 U.S. at 581. 
141 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Strong-
hold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 18 
(1998). 
142 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
143 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603. 
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ples.144 Although the Court qualified the scope of these cases—the so-
called Chinese Exclusion Cases—in the twentieth century, the vestiges of 
plenary power remain.145 The Court has declared noncitizens “persons” 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, enabling legal immigrants to challenge federal laws that discrimi-
nate based upon alienage.146 Notwithstanding this constitutional protec-
tion, the plenary power doctrine allows even the most discriminatory 
federal immigrant-related statutes to survive legal challenges.147 
 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mathews v. Diaz, which 
involved a federal law that withheld government benefits based upon 
alienage.148 The equal protection challenge concerned a provision of 
the Social Security Act that restricted noncitizen participation in Medi-
care Part B (outpatient care) to legal permanent residents who had 
maintained their lawful resident status in the United States for a mini-
mum of five years.149 The Court acknowledged that noncitizens consti-
tute a discrete and insular minority but invoked a rational basis stan-
dard of review to find that the exclusion was not “wholly irrational” 
because it was reasonably related to governmental budgetary con-
straints.150 Mathews expanded the federal government’s sweeping ple-
nary power over immigration into the realm of economic benefits.151 
The Court held that the federal government may restrict lawful immi-
grants from subsidized health programs without providing a compel-
ling justification.152 Although subsequent cases have restrained this 
sweeping deference to the federal legislature,153 Mathews signaled the 
Court’s willingness to subvert the due process claims of noncitizens to 
the federal government’s interest in regulating immigration.154 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Chin, supra note 141, at 18 (arguing that racism underscores the plenary power 
doctrine). 
145 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) (cautioning that federal action con-
cerning immigration is not completely insulated from judicial review and that the courts 
have some authority to review due process challenges by immigrants). 
146 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. 
147 See Wishnie, supra note 90, at 503–04 (arguing that, despite the inequities of the 
plenary power doctrine, finding alternative ways to protect the constitutional rights of 
immigrants may be more effective than attacking the doctrine itself). 
148 426 U.S. at 69. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 83. 
151 See id. at 79–80. 
152 See id. 
153 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5; Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) 
(qualifying the scope of the federal plenary power by requiring the government to demon-
strate that an immigration restriction was motivated by an overriding national interest). 
154 See 426 U.S. at 81. 
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3. Strict Scrutiny for State-Funded Benefits Programs 
 In 1971, five years before Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously struck down state legislation in Graham v. Richardson 
that—similar to the federal legislation in Mathews—restricted benefits 
eligibility based on citizenship status.155 The Court consolidated appeals 
from Arizona and Pennsylvania that challenged restrictions on nonciti-
zens in state public benefits programs.156 The Arizona law at issue pro-
vided welfare benefits to U.S. citizens and to legal permanent residents 
who had resided in the United States for fifteen years or more.157 Oth-
erwise eligible legal immigrants who did not meet this state-imposed 
durational residency requirement were therefore excluded from the 
welfare program.158 The Pennsylvania law was more restrictive: it pre-
cluded any noncitizen from receiving state-funded welfare benefits.159 
Examining Arizona and Pennsylvania’s imposition of welfare restric-
tions on lawful immigrants, the Court employed a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review to invalidate the statutes.160 Reasoning that legal perma-
nent residents shoulder important civic duties like paying taxes and 
registering for the selective service, Justice Blackmun rejected the state 
defendants’ claims that the allocation of scarce government resources 
necessitated limiting welfare benefits to citizens.161 Therefore, in 
Mathews and Graham, the Court articulated vastly disparate standards of 
review depending on whether a state or the federal government en-
acted the statute.162 The Court defended this disparity on the grounds 
that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substan-
tially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the fed-
eral power over immigration and naturalization.”163 
  The Court consistently adheres to a strict federal-state dichotomy 
in examining legislation that discriminates against noncitizens, not-
                                                                                                                      
155 Graham, 403 U.S. at 383. 
156 Id. at 366. 
157 Id. at 367. 
158 Id. 
159 See id. at 368. The Pennsylvania statute provided, however, that immigrants who 
were eligible for the jointly funded state-federal program could receive state-federal wel-
fare benefits. See id. Therefore, the restriction was limited to wholly state-funded welfare 
benefits. See id. 
160 See id. at 376. 
161 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 375 (reasoning that “[s]ince an alien as well as a citizen is a 
‘person’ for equal protection purposes, a concern for fiscal integrity is no more compel-
ling a justification for the questioned classification in these cases than” an imposition of a 
one-year residency requirement in a particular state to receive federal welfare benefits). 
162 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85; Graham, 403 U.S. at 375. 
163 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87. 
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withstanding the intermediate standard of review reserved for unlaw-
fully present immigrants.164 Therefore, the Court upholds most federal 
legislation that restricts the rights of noncitizens to government bene-
fits and privileges and invalidates most parallel state legislation.165 
Moreover, individual state courts generally invalidate state statutes and 
regulations that, if promulgated by Congress, would be upheld as con-
stitutional.166 Whereas federal laws concerning economic benefits that 
classify and target legal immigrants are categorized as immigration laws, 
their state counterparts are categorized as alienage laws, even when the 
laws are identical but for this national-local distinction.167 
4. Post-PRA Equal Protection Challenges: Federal v. State Restrictions 
 The PRA disrupted decades of federal and state precedent.168 Pre-
viously, courts applied a rational basis standard of review to federal legis-
lation that discriminates against noncitizens in government programs, 
and a strict scrutiny standard of review to parallel state legislation.169 Be-
cause the PRA contained a delegation of the federal government’s ple-
nary immigration power, the legislation attempted to replace the Gra-
ham test for state legislation with a Mathews rational basis standard.170 
Noncitizens that were newly precluded from subsidy programs brought 
equal protection challenges, both in federal and state courts.171 
                                                                                                                      
164 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24 (establishing an “intermediate” scrutiny for state dis-
crimination against undocumented immigrants); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67 (reasoning that 
markedly different standards of review apply to states and the federal government); Graham, 
403 U.S. at 372 (holding that state legislation must be subjected to strict scrutiny review). 
165 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85; Graham, 403 U.S. at 365; see also Takahashi v. Fish & 
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1948) (holding that state statute discriminating 
against legal residents in issuance of commercial licenses violated equal protection). 
166 See Barannikova v. Town of Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 264–65 (Conn. 1994) (invali-
dating town ordinance utilizing different methods of computing welfare benefits for legal 
residents and citizens); El Souri v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 414 N.W.2d 679, 686–87 (Mich. 
1987) (utilizing a strict scrutiny standard of review to invalidate a state ordinance subject-
ing only noncitizens to “sponsor deeming” in state-run welfare program). 
167 See Wishnie, supra note 90, at 505; see also Graham, 403 U.S. at 380 (construing state 
laws affecting immigrants as alien residency requirements that encroach upon the federal 
power to regulate immigrants’ entrance and abode). 
168 See infra notes 169–200 and accompanying text. 
169 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87; Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
170 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2006) (importing rational basis language into PRA-supported 
state legislation); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87; Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
171 See infra notes 172–198 and accompanying text. 
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 The first line of cases challenged the restrictions on legal perma-
nent residents in federally administered programs.172 The underlying 
premise of plaintiffs’ arguments was that the courts may defer to the 
federal political branches on immigration but not on economic pol-
icy.173 Plaintiffs reasoned that Congress and the President have the sole 
discretion to regulate foreign affairs, whereas economic benefits may be 
administered by any federal or state agency.174 Although deference is 
certainly warranted in certain circumstances, advocates questioned 
whether the internal regulation of economic benefits fits into this cate-
gory.175 These lawsuits alleged that the PRA’s restrictions on public 
benefit programs for legal immigrants had a negligible impact upon the 
political branches’ relationships with foreign nations.176 Therefore, 
Congress was not authorized to invoke the plenary power and was not 
entitled to judicial deference.177 Generally, these claims were unsuccess-
ful: courts held that the plenary immigration power insulates federal 
benefits restrictions from searching judicial review.178 
 Immigrants who were newly ineligible for state, as opposed to fed-
eral, programs had more success in the courts.179 In 2001 in Aliessa ex 
                                                                                                                      
172 See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d. Cir. 2001) (upholding rational basis 
standard of review for PRA Medicaid restrictions in accordance with federal guidelines); City 
of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming immigration restrictions 
on federal programs in the 1996 PRA as constitutionally valid); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. 
Supp. 799, 820–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (affirming noncitizen restrictions on food stamps and 
supplemental security income); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 891–92 (S.D. 
1999) (affirming PRA restrictions on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) wel-
fare grants to noncitizens). 
173 See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 583; Shalala, 189 F.3d at 603–04; Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 806–11; 
Cid, 598 N.W.2d at 891–92. 
174 See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 582–84; Shalala, 189 F.3d at 601–02; Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 806–
07; Cid, 598 N.W.2d at 891–92. 
175 See Shalala, 189 F.3d at 604–05; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224–25 (rejecting state defen-
dant’s contention that public education is related to immigration regulation and policy). 
176 See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 582–84; Shalala, 189 F.3d at 604; Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 806–07; 
Cid, 598 N.W.2d at 891–92. 
177 See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 582–83; Shalala, 189 F.3d at 604; Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 806; 
Cid, 598 N.W.2d at 891–93. 
178 See Lewis, 252 F.3d at 583; Shalala, 189 F.3d at 604–05, 607; Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 
807–11; Cid, 598 N.W.2d at 892–93. But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1999). The 
Court invalidated a statute that imposed a twelve-month waiting period for welfare bene-
fits, despite authorization by the PRA for the legislation. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–02. By ap-
plying strict scrutiny review, the Court determined that the statute violated the right to 
travel in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause by unconstitu-
tionally classifying individuals based upon durational residency. See id. 
179 See Kurti v. Maricopa Cnty., 33 P.3d 499, 501 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding PRA-
sanctioned restrictions on state-funded Medicaid violated the Equal Protection Clause); 
Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1233 (Md. 2006) (holding PRA-authorized denial of 
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rel. Fayad v. Novello, the New York Court of Appeals struck down a state 
statute enacted in response to the PRA.180 The statute eliminated state-
funded Medicaid eligibility for many categories of immigrants that were 
previously eligible, including PRUCOLs, newly adjusted legal perma-
nent residents, and additional categories of immigrants deemed “un-
qualified” under the new PRA provisions.181 After considering a state 
constitutional claim, the court considered the equal protection rights 
of the plaintiffs.182 The court subjected the state statute to strict scrutiny 
review and held that the government could not withhold economic 
benefits from lawfully present immigrants without demonstrating that 
such withholding was the least restrictive means of satisfying a compel-
ling governmental interest.183 Notably, the court held that the conserva-
tion of scarce fiscal resources was not a compelling governmental inter-
est.184 The court echoed Graham when it held that the PRA was an 
unlawful delegation of plenary power to the states, reasoning that the 
federal government cannot authorize the states to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.185 New York had not limited eligibility for Medicaid 
beyond the federal scheme, so the court essentially declared that the 
PRA alienage restrictions, when literally translated into state statutes, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.186 
 In 2006, in Ehrlich v. Perez, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted 
the Aliessa court’s reasoning and affirmed the trial court’s grant of an 
injunction to prevent implementation of a 2005 state budget provision 
that adopted the federal five-year bar to legal permanent residents’ re-
ceipt of Medicaid.187 The court reasoned that the state’s budgetary cuts 
could not survive a strict scrutiny standard of review, even though the 
budget provisions accorded with parallel PRA-sanctioned federal eligi-
bility guidelines.188 As a result, both New York and Maryland now pro-
                                                                                                                      
Medicaid benefits to lawful permanent residents subject to strict scrutiny and likely to suc-
ceed on the merits); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1096 (N.Y. 2001) 
(striking a PRA-sanctioned regulation eliminating state-funded Medicaid benefits for PRU-
COL and qualified aliens who had not fulfilled a five-year residency requirement). 
180 See 754 N.E.2d at 1096. 
181 See Karin H. Berg, Note, May Congress Grant the States the Power to Violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause? Aliessa v. Novello and Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 17 BYU J. Pub. L. 297, 302 (2003). 
182 See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1094. 
183 See id. at 1098. 
184 See id. at 1096. 
185 Id. at 1098. 
186 See id. 
187 See Erlich, 908 A.2d at 1228. 
188 See id. at 1233. 
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vide supplemental state Medicaid coverage to legal permanent resi-
dents who are subject to the five-year bar for federal-state Medicaid 
coverage.189 
 Additional post-PRA challenges have examined the constitutional-
ity of state statutes that restrict immigrant eligibility requirements be-
yond even the federal scheme.190 In 2001 in Kurti v. Maricopa County, 
the Arizona Court of Appeals invalidated a county ordinance restricting 
subsidized healthcare to citizens and legal permanent residents who 
entered prior to August 22, 1996.191 The court reasoned that the eligi-
bility restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause because they ex-
ceeded the parameters of the federal equivalent.192 Had the county re-
stricted eligibility in exact accordance with the federal guidelines, 
however, the court would likely have upheld the restrictions (unlike the 
Aliessa and Ehrlich courts).193 
 In 2003, in Soskin v. Reinertson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of Colorado’s decision to 
remove all noncitizens from the federal-state Medicaid rolls.194 The 
court upheld the Colorado measure, diverging from the New York and 
Maryland high courts in its equal protection analysis.195 The court dis-
tinguished the case from Graham, holding that strict scrutiny was not 
applicable because the PRA only granted states a small window of varia-
tion in their state-federal programs, and the state was not independently 
creating alienage classifications if it legislated within that window.196 The 
court invoked the plenary powers of the federal government to regulate 
immigration and concluded that, under a rational basis standard of re-
view, the PRA was valid and Colorado’s budget plan thus did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.197 Notably, the Soskin court considered a 
federal-state Medicaid program, whereas the Aliessa court considered a 
state-funded Medicaid program.198 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 15-103(a)(1)(2) (West 2010); 18 N.Y. Comp. 
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 349.3(2)(b)(iv) (2008); Fremstad & Cox, supra note 107, at 29. 
190 See Kurti, 33 P.3d at 501. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the constitutionality of 
the PRA’s statutory delegation to the states, and there remains a con-
flict between the high courts of New York and Maryland, on the one 
hand, and the Tenth Circuit, on the other.199 It is unclear how the 
Court would rule, given that state discrimination against noncitizens 
may be subjected either to the Mathews rational basis test or the Graham 
strict scrutiny test, depending on how the law in question is classified.200 
D. The Massachusetts Model and Federal Healthcare Reform 
1. The Massachusetts Model: Retreating from Universal Coverage 
 On April 12, 2006, Massachusetts passed An Act Providing Access 
to Affordable, Quality, and Accountable Health Care (the “Massachu-
setts Act”).201 The legislation was prompted by a looming budget crisis 
largely caused by the discrepancy between the mandates of EMTALA, 
which required hospitals to treat all patients with a medical emergency, 
and stringent Medicaid restrictions, which rendered many patients in-
eligible for coverage.202 Massachusetts had borrowed federal Medicaid 
dollars, at an unsustainable pace, to reimburse its public hospitals for 
the growing expense of treating the uninsured.203 Because Massachu-
setts adopted the PRA’s federal immigration restrictions, a large per-
centage of individuals receiving uncompensated care at public hospitals 
were noncitizens ineligible for Medicaid.204 As Massachusetts has a rela-
tively large percentage of noncitizen residents, its reforms are a model 
for expanding noncitizen access to health insurance.205 Additionally, 
although Massachusetts residents were more likely than the average 
                                                                                                                      
199 See Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255; Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1233; Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096. 
200 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87; Graham, 403 U.S. at 371. 
201 An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality and Accountable Healthcare, 2006 
Mass. Acts. 111–202 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M, §§ 1–5 (2006)). 
202 See Knutson, supra note 99, at 404–05 (indicating that the PRA created a shrinking 
pool of Medicaid-eligible emergency room patients, resulting in budget shortfalls for pub-
lic hospitals). 
203 See John Holahan et al., Caring for the Uninsured in Massachusetts: What Does It Cost, Who 
Pays, and What Would Full Coverage Add to Medical Spending?, 2004 Urb. Inst. 31, available at 
http://bluecrossfoundation.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Roadmap%20to%20Coverage/041 
116RTCCostsCaringForUninsuredHolahan.pdf (indicating an increase in state reimburse-
ments to hospitals providing emergency room care to the uninsured). 
204 See 130 Mass. Code Regs. § 504.002(B), (F) (2006) (defining qualified aliens by 
the PRA guidelines and precluding unqualified aliens from participation in MassHealth). 
205 Massachusetts Quick Facts from the US Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25000.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (stating that twelve 
percent of the Massachusetts population is foreign-born). 
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U.S. resident to have employer-sponsored health insurance, immigrants 
tend to be concentrated in industries with historically low percentages 
of employer-sponsored health coverage.206 
 Prior to the Massachusetts Act’s passage, all lawful immigrants who 
did not fall under narrow PRA eligibility requirements were ineligible 
for Medicaid (MassHealth) and were therefore ineligible for non-
emergency medical care.207 Yet the Act allows “special status immi-
grants,” defined as legally present immigrants ineligible for the federal-
state program, to participate in the newly created Commonwealth Care 
program.208 Alternatively, if their income was too high, special status 
immigrants could purchase a low-cost plan from a private insurer 
through the newly created Commonwealth Connector referral ser-
vice.209 One year later, between two and three hundred thousand Mas-
sachusetts residents who were previously uninsured were covered, with 
two out of three receiving subsidized state care.210 By 2009, only 2.6% of 
residents were uninsured, compared to the national average of 15%.211 
 Due to the economic crisis beginning in 2008, the Massachusetts 
legislature faced an insurmountable budget shortfall.212 The legislature 
voted to trim the Commonwealth Care program and directed nearly all 
of the budget cuts at noncitizens who were participating in the pro-
gram by voting to terminate the coverage of legal permanent residents 
                                                                                                                      
206 See Tamara Forys, Introduction, Left Out in the Cold: How the United States’ Healthcare 
System Excludes Immigrants, 17 Annals Health L. 351, 352 (2008). 
207 See 130 Mass. Code Regs. § 504.002(F)(2) (2009) (defining “special status immi-
grants” as unqualified aliens in the federal PRA and declaring that special status immigrants 
are ineligible for MassHealth). 
208 See Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andres Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachusetts: 
Setting the Standard for National Reform, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 409, 415–16 (2008). Com-
monwealth Care provides coverage for individuals and families earning between 100% and 
300% of the federal poverty level (“FPL”). Id. The program sets a low premium scale ac-
cording to income, where households earning less than 133% of the FPL pay no premiums 
at all, and households earning the maximum pay $130 per month in premiums. Id. Until 
September 1, 2009, all legally present, income-eligible immigrants who were ineligible for 
MassHealth due to their immigration status received coverage under Commonwealth 
Care. See id. In 2009, this coverage option was eliminated for this category of immigrants. 
See Act of Aug. 7, 2009, 2009 Mass. Acts 695. 
209 See Matthew Kanter, Healthy Start: A Policy and Legal Analysis of Health Care Reform in 
Massachusetts, 2 McGill J.L. & Health 65, 66–67 (2008). The Connector is a “state char-
tered clearinghouse” from which households earnings above three hundred percent of the 
FPL and small businesses can purchase, with pre-tax dollars, private insurance plans whose 
rates are bargained for by the state. Id. 
210 See Chirba-Martin & Torres, supra note 208, at 416–17. 
211 Goodnough, supra note 8. 
212 Goodnough, supra note 2. 
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who had adjusted status less than five years ago.213 The legislature chose 
to cut back services for legal permanent residents to avoid reducing any 
services available to citizens.214 At the urging of Governor Deval Patrick, 
the legislature compromised and created a stripped-down program, 
administered by CeltiCare, to provide limited healthcare coverage to 
any immigrant who was enrolled in Commonwealth Care as of August 
1, 2009.215 Legal immigrants not already enrolled in Commonwealth 
Care on that date, however, were ineligible for any subsidized health 
insurance program.216 Although the legislature determined that Celti-
Care was an adequate plan for legal immigrants, it was deemed insuffi-
cient as a general provider for Massachusetts residents.217 The recent 
class action lawsuit, filed by Health Law Advocates, alleges that legal 
immigrants in Massachusetts have been unconstitutionally singled out 
for disparate treatment.218 
2. Federal Healthcare Reform: Retaining the Five-Year Bar 
 On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act into law.219 The long-awaited federal 
healthcare reform legislation is expected to cover an additional thirty-
two million Americans by 2019.220 In addition to creating state-run 
healthcare exchanges, the healthcare reform legislation expands Medi-
caid eligibility, requiring states to provide Medicaid to any individual or 
family whose annual income is at or below 133% of the federal poverty 
level.221 Congress declined to repeal many of the immigrant restrictions 
enacted in the PRA.222 Notably, the new legislation retains the five-year 
                                                                                                                      
213 See 2009 Mass. Acts 695. 
214 See Julia Preston, Health Care Debate Revives Immigration Battle, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 
2009, at A22. 
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work coverage and inadequate range of provider choices in its decision. See id. 
218 See Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. 
219 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119. 
220 See Kaiser Comm’n on Healthcare & the Uninsured, Focus on Health Re-
form: Summary of Coverage Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act 1 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8023-R.pdf. 
221 Id. 
222 See National Immigration Law Center, supra note 18, at 1. 
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bar to Medicaid for legal permanent residents.223 Furthermore, low-
income legal immigrants who would qualify for Medicaid but for their 
immigration status cannot receive the premium tax credits and cost-
sharing reductions available to citizens in state-run healthcare ex-
changes, and must pay market rates for these plans.224 Therefore, the 
five-year bar carries over into the healthcare exchanges.225 Legal immi-
grants may purchase health insurance through the exchange but will 
not receive any healthcare subsidies.226 It appears that these measures, 
which adopt the PRA’s immigration restrictions, will adversely impact 
lower-income immigrants who may be unable to afford the full pre-
mium rates through the exchange.227 Furthermore, all legal immigrants 
are subject to the individual healthcare mandate, even though this 
population cannot receive any government subsidies or tax credits.228 
The debates in both houses were reminiscent of the PRA era, with Re-
publicans warning that covering legal permanent residents as soon as 
they adjust status would serve as a “magnet” for immigration to the 
United States.229 Ultimately, political pressure and concern for voting 
constituents resulted in legislation that largely overlooks the healthcare 
needs of noncitizens.230 
 Despite the enactment of an ambitious healthcare reform bill, it 
appears that federal guidelines will not revert back to their pre-PRA 
form, when legal immigrants enjoyed access to affordable healthcare.231 
Therefore, state-funded healthcare programs continue to provide the 
only source of subsidized health insurance for legal immigrants.232 
States may replicate the Massachusetts model, and the outcome of the 
                                                                                                                      
223 Id. 
224 Id. Therefore, the same immigration restrictions that the PRA implemented for re-
ceipt of Medicaid apply to receipt of premium tax and cost-sharing reductions in the ex-
change. See id. 
225 See id. 
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pending equal protection challenge will likely determine whether legal 
immigrants nationwide enjoy equal access to state-funded healthcare 
programs.233 Notwithstanding equal protection considerations, states 
must consider the economic impact of excluding legal immigrants 
from their subsidized healthcare programs while remaining subject to 
the EMTALA mandate.234 
II. Equal Protection and Economic Sustainability Converge: Why 
Invalidating Alienage Restrictions in State-Funded Health 
Insurance Programs Makes Legal and Economic Sense 
 Given that federal Medicaid expansion excludes newly adjusted 
legal immigrants, state-funded Medicaid programs continue to provide 
the only source of subsidized medical coverage to this population.235 
Unfortunately, noncitizens are the first to lose state-funded Medicaid 
eligibility as state legislatures grapple with record deficits.236 Foreclosed 
from direct political participation, legal immigrants must turn to the 
courts to assert their equal protection rights to state-funded Medi-
caid.237 Because the “Massachusetts model” is likely to be replicated by 
other states considering healthcare expansion, the recent actions taken 
by the Massachusetts legislature highlight the need for close judicial 
scrutiny.238 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should use the 
strict scrutiny standard established in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 
decision in Graham v. Richardson to hold that classification of benefits 
based on alienage violates the Equal Protection Clause.239 
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234 See Immigration Policy Ctr., Including Legal Immigrants in Healthcare Re-
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 Section A of this Part analyzes the arguments for and against a 
strict scrutiny standard of review in the Massachusetts context.240 It 
concludes that a state cannot terminate legal immigrants from its state-
funded Medicaid program even if the restrictions adhere to the PRA 
guidelines.241 Congress’s plenary power over immigration does not ex-
tend to the allocation of economic benefits within individual states for 
several reasons: First, the issue of state healthcare benefits is neither 
related to the federal immigration power, nor a “political question” of 
the type that is typically nonjusticiable.242 Second, Congress cannot 
proclaim that the PRA guidelines satisfy a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view when adopted by the states, because such a proclamation usurps 
the role of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers.243 Third, 
delegation to the states contravenes uniformity in setting immigration 
policy and is therefore inconsistent with both textual and jurispruden-
tial justifications for the federal plenary power.244 
 Section B of this Part argues that from a policy standpoint, state-
funded Medicaid restrictions adversely impact both legal immigrants 
and the general public.245 Allowing the states to discriminate against 
legal immigrants contravenes the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and perpetuates inequality.246 Practically, foreclosing health insurance 
coverage for lawfully present immigrants simply shifts the costs of 
treatment from cost-efficient, preventive care, to emergency rooms.247 
Because legal permanent residents tend to remain permanently in the 
United States, providing timely access to preventive care controls the 
                                                                                                                      
fined by the federal PRA, and declaring that special status immigrants are ineligible for 
MassHealth); Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 10, at 1 (alleging that the Massachusetts 
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240 See infra notes 242–331 and accompanying text. 
241 See infra notes 242–331 and accompanying text. 
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247 See infra notes 332–341 and accompanying text. 
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future costs of untreated illnesses.248 Finally, restrictions on some immi-
grants cause ripple effects within the entire immigrant community by 
discouraging participation in government-funded programs.249 
A. State-Funded Medicaid Programs That Place Eligibility Restrictions on 
Lawful Immigrants Violate the Equal Protection Clause 
 When state-funded Medicaid programs restrict the eligibility of le-
gal immigrants, they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.250 The U.S. Supreme Court, balancing equality concerns 
against a significant national security and foreign affairs interest, has 
held that the Constitution grants the federal government plenary power 
over immigration.251 Because national security and foreign policy lie 
solely within the powers of the federal government, the states cannot 
invoke the plenary power.252 But state laws that restrict lawful immi-
grants from subsidized healthcare programs are not immigration laws,253 
even when a state’s regulation impacts immigration.254 Therefore, a 
challenge to a state-enacted alienage classification must be based in the 
Equal Protection Clause rather than the federal plenary immigration 
power.255 When states discriminate against lawful immigrants, a “suspect 
class,” the Court will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review.256 Under 
this standard, the discriminatory regulation must be necessary to fur-
ther a compelling governmental interest. The Graham Court deter-
mined that a state’s restricting benefits for lawful immigrants to con-
serve scarce fiscal resources does not constitute a compelling 
governmental interest.257 Therefore, the Massachusetts and New Jersey 
legislatures’ decision to terminate lawful immigrants from state-funded 
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251 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
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healthcare programs to reconcile a looming budget deficit violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.258 
 Furthermore, Congress cannot invoke its plenary power to author-
ize individual states to adopt federal alienage classifications in their re-
spective state-funded benefits programs.259 The PRA’s proclamation 
that states implementing the federal restrictions shall satisfy a strict 
scrutiny standard of review is an unconstitutional usurpation of the ju-
diciary’s role.260 Congress cannot authorize the states to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.261 
1. State Healthcare Legislation Does Not Invoke the Federal Plenary 
Immigration Power and Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny 
 The PRA asserts that federal public benefits policy affects immigra-
tion patterns and declares restrictions necessary to ensure that “[t]he 
availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigra-
tion to the United States.”262 This alleged nexus between immigration 
and the availability of federal benefits is itself widely contested.263 For 
many scholars, the PRA ignores the distinction between border control 
laws, which legitimately invoke the federal plenary power, and eco-
nomic benefits laws and regulations that concern immigrants living 
within our borders, which do not invoke the same national priorities.264 
Distinguishing between immigration and alienage laws in the federal 
context, however, is difficult because federal legislation often contains 
elements of both.265 The PRA’s claim that the availability of benefits in 
the United States affects immigration patterns is refuted by statistical 
surveys, which conclude that most immigrants come to the United 
States for work.266 Indeed, the decision to immigrate to the United 
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States is seldom motivated by the availability of public benefits.267 Al-
though a nexus between federal benefits and immigration is possible, 
state benefits legislation clearly falls outside the purview of national 
immigration law.268 Echoing this widely accepted dichotomy between 
state and federal legislation, the Supreme Court in 1976 in Mathews v. 
Diaz reasoned that: 
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if 
any, basis for treating persons from another State differently 
from per-sons who are citizens of another country. Both 
groups are noncitizens as far as the State’s interests in adminis-
tering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by 
a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that 
State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has 
no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification 
by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legiti-
mate part of its business.269 
 For two decades, Mathews controlled challenges to federal legisla-
tion, and Graham controlled challenges to state legislation.270 The PRA 
contains two controversial provisions that import a Mathews rational 
basis standard into state alienage laws, and thereby muddle the bright-
line test.271 First, 8 U.S.C. § 1622 permits a state to restrict eligibility for 
jointly funded state-federal programs beyond the mandatory immigrant 
restrictions imposed by the PRA.272 Second, § 1621 permits a state to 
impose alienage restrictions in state and locally funded programs, and 
§ 1607 declares that states that import the federal restrictions into their 
own programs will satisfy a strict scrutiny standard of review.273 These 
latter provisions purport to authorize Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
any state providing state-funded healthcare benefits to prohibit or sub-
sequently terminate the participation of legal immigrants without 
demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.274 
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 May Congress insulate state-funded health insurance programs 
from judicial scrutiny by delegating the federal plenary power? Several 
cases suggest that it cannot: the PRA does not alter the existing strict 
scrutiny standard of review in this context.275 Therefore, the claims by 
Massachusetts and New Jersey that their alienage discrimination is fed-
erally authorized should be rejected by those states’ high courts.276 
 First, the PRA does not disturb the Court’s holding and analysis in 
Graham.277 Although it predates the PRA, Graham suggests that chal-
lenges to state alienage classifications that are authorized by Congress 
remain subject to strict scrutiny review.278 In Graham, Arizona defended 
its durational residency requirement—resembling the five-year bar im-
posed on legal permanent residents in the PRA—by claiming the re-
striction was actually authorized by federal law.279 Although the Court 
rejected this argument and treated the statute as Arizona’s, it stated in 
dicta that if the federal statute were “to be read so as to authorize dis-
criminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States, Takahashi [v. 
Fish & Game Commission] demonstrates that serious constitutional questions 
are presented.”280 The Court forcefully concluded that “Congress does 
not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.”281 This unanimous opinion suggests that the 
PRA’s authorization of alienage classification by the states does not alter 
the level of scrutiny applied to a state-funded program.282 Therefore, 
the legal immigrants residing in Massachusetts and New Jersey who 
challenged their termination from state-funded health insurance pro-
grams may rely on Graham.283 Relying on Graham, the state high courts 
should apply strict scrutiny review to each state’s actions, and should 
therefore invalidate the legislation.284 
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 Following Graham, the Supreme Court created exceptions to the 
general rule that state alienage classifications are unconstitutional. In 
Sugarman v. Dougall, decided in 1973, the Court recognized that an in-
dividual state’s ability to establish and maintain its own representative 
government constituted a compelling governmental interest, but that 
this compelling interest must be narrowly construed.285 Articulating the 
exception, the Court drew a sharp distinction between state restrictions 
that serve a political function and those that serve an economic func-
tion, holding that the latter does not serve a compelling governmental 
interest.286 Clearly, a state-funded health insurance program is an eco-
nomic benefit and therefore remains at the core of Graham’s strict scru-
tiny standard of review.287 
 Moreover, the PRA’s delegation of federal plenary power over im-
migration violates the separation of powers doctrine.288 In the PRA, 
Congress declares that states adopting the federal immigration restric-
tions in state-funded benefits programs will satisfy the strict scrutiny 
standard of review.289 The Court, however, not the legislature, is en-
trusted both with defining the scope of the rights guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and with determining whether a particular law 
violates those rights.290 
 In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress ex-
ceeded its legislative authority when it statutorily proscribed a strict 
scrutiny standard of review for challenges brought by plaintiffs assert-
ing that a state law burdened their religious practice.291 Although in 
City of Boerne Congress expanded individuals’ protection vis-à-vis the 
states, whereas the PRA attempts to insulate state legislation from judi-
cial review, the same separation of powers principles articulated by the 
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Court apply to both laws.292 In City of Boerne, the Court rejected the no-
tion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s restrictions on the states.293 The decision thus 
suggests that Massachusetts and New Jersey cannot invoke the rational 
basis standard of review pursuant to section 1607 of the PRA: the Court 
has already held that Congress violates separation of powers principles 
when it prescribes the standard of review for equal protection chal-
lenges to state action.294 
2. Post-PRA Cases Suggest that the Massachusetts and New Jersey Cuts 
Cannot Survive an Equal Protection Challenge 
 Although post-PRA case law is not extensive, the precedent set by 
various state and federal courts suggests that the Massachusetts and 
New Jersey courts should invalidate the state’s recent alienage restric-
tions.295 Following enactment of the PRA, states promulgated new regu-
lations that incorporate mandatory immigration restrictions into their 
jointly funded federal-state programs.296 The outcome of an equal pro-
tection challenge in this area generally hinges on how the court classi-
fies the challenged law: if the law is construed as an administrative rule 
that simply codifies the federal requirements, the court will generally 
apply a rational basis standard of review and affirm the regulations as 
an extension of the federal plenary immigration power.297 When a 
regulation complies with federal guidelines, it is in furtherance of the 
plenary power rationale for preserving uniformity in the administra-
tion of federal government benefits.298 In 1999, in Cid v. South Dakota 
Department of Social Services, the South Dakota Supreme Court consid-
ered a challenge to the state’s administrative rules implementing the 
five-year bar in Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, and 
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food stamp programs.299 In affirming the regulation, the court distin-
guished South Dakota’s administrative rule from the state statute at is-
sue in Graham.300 The court upheld the rule because it merely imple-
mented the PRA’s mandatory restrictions on jointly administered state-
federal programs.301 Additional challenges to state-enacted administra-
tive rules have similarly been upheld in other states under a rational 
basis standard of review.302 But state-funded healthcare restrictions, like 
those in Massachusetts and New Jersey, do not implement mandatory, 
uniform federal guidelines and do not comply with a mandatory provi-
sion for receiving federal funding.303 Instead, these restrictions were 
wholly created by the state legislatures.304 
 This distinction is important because although a state’s compli-
ance with mandatory federal guidelines invokes rational basis review, 
the courts regard independent state legislation differently.305 State 
regulations applying section 1621 of the PRA (permitting adoption of 
the federal guidelines in state-funded benefits programs) are generally 
invalidated by the courts.306 The Graham Court’s proclamation that 
“Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause” has survived the PRA.307 In 2001 in 
Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, for example, the New York Court of Ap-
peals invalidated the state’s restrictions on legal immigrants’ access to 
benefits programs.308 Following the PRA, New York amended eligibility 
requirements for its state-funded Medicaid program, mirroring the re-
strictions in the jointly funded Medicaid program.309 Like Common-
wealth Care and FamilyCare, the state-funded Medicaid program was 
designed to supplement federal-state Medicaid coverage, and, also like 
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Commonwealth Care and FamilyCare, New York provided benefits for 
both immigrants and citizens under its supplemental program.310 The 
state defendants had argued that the supplemental program mirrored 
the PRA eligibility restrictions and served as an extension of federal 
legislation, and was therefore within the purview of the federal plenary 
immigration power.311 The New York Court of Appeals relied on Gra-
ham to reject this argument.312 It reasoned that the federal government, 
in granting the states sole discretion to determine eligibility guidelines 
for state-funded benefits programs, is not implementing uniform im-
migration laws.313 Although the PRA encourages states to mirror the 
federal eligibility requirements in their respective state programs, it 
cannot delegate its plenary power to independent state legislation.314 
Subsequently, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated legislation 
that imposed a five-year bar in its state-funded Medicaid program.315 
The court rejected the state defendant’s claims that the restrictions 
mirrored and were authorized by the PRA and instead adopted the Ali-
essa court’s reasoning.316 
 Colorado, like Massachusetts and New Jersey, dealt with its budget 
crisis by targeting noncitizens for healthcare cuts.317 The legislature, in 
accordance with PRA, enacted restrictions that exceeded the suggested 
federal guidelines.318 In 2004, in Soskin v. Reinertson, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the cuts, holding that Graham did 
not apply in the specific situation.319 The court reasoned that, because 
the PRA permits only a small window of variation for states to deter-
mine immigrant eligibility for jointly funded state-federal Medicaid, the 
PRA does not delegate any immigration power to the states.320 Still, the 
Soskin holding does not implicate the Massachusetts legislature’s 
alienage classification because the holding applies only to the jointly 
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funded state-federal Medicaid program.321 Notwithstanding the criti-
cism surrounding the Soskin court’s analysis,322 the holding does not 
apply to the Massachusetts and New Jersey restrictions. The PRA sets no 
mandatory guidelines that states must follow in running state-funded 
healthcare programs.323 Massachusetts and New Jersey, unlike Colo-
rado, are not operating within a limited window of discretion but are 
legislating independently of a federal classification scheme.324 
 Finally, denying legal immigrants, who constitute a discrete and 
insular minority, a strict scrutiny standard of review contravenes the 
equality principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.325 For over 
a century, the U.S. Supreme Court has maintained that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause ensures that “all persons residing lawfully in this country 
shall abide in any state on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens 
under nondiscriminatory laws.”326 Discrimination against lawful immi-
grants is no less invidious than other forms of discrimination prohib-
ited by the Fourteenth Amendment.327 The federal government is 
vested with a plenary immigration power, arguably, because the need to 
protect national security, enact sensible foreign affairs policy, and en-
sure uniformity in the admission, exclusion and naturalization of im-
migrants outweighs the effects of the resulting discrimination.328 Ex-
tending this power to the individual states, which possess no national 
security, foreign affairs, or immigration lawmaking power, would ignore 
over a century of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits dis-
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criminating against lawful immigrants.329 In Massachusetts, lawful im-
migrants are foreclosed from a program supported by their tax dollars 
and yet are legally mandated to purchase market-rate private health 
insurance or face significant tax penalties.330 Insulating discrimination 
that targets a politically vulnerable minority from judicial review of-
fends the principles of equality enshrined in the Constitution.331 
B. Restricting Legal Immigrants’ Access to State-Funded Health Insurance Is 
Detrimental to Immigrants and Citizens Alike 
 When state-funded healthcare programs restrict access to nonciti-
zens, both immigrants and citizens suffer adverse consequences.332 
From an economic perspective, the shifting of costs from subsidized, 
preventive care to emergency-room treatment increases medical costs 
and exacerbates state budget deficits.333 From a social policy perspec-
tive, restricting noncitizens’ healthcare access decreases participation in 
government programs that are vital to the public interest.334 
 Irrespective of the restrictions enacted in the PRA and by individ-
ual states, EMTALA requires that all hospitals treat medical emergen-
cies regardless of a patient’s immigration status.335 Therefore, legal 
immigrants without access to preventive care will still be treated at 
emergency rooms, but at a significantly higher cost.336 Statistically, treat-
ing illnesses with preventive care results in significant cost savings and 
vastly improves chances of recovery and reduction of severe symp-
toms.337 According to the Director of the Kaiser Family Foundation’s 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, restricting healthcare 
subsidies means that “we are already paying a substantial amount to 
care for a large uninsured population without any guarantee of cover-
age,” and “we pay for care in the least efficient way possible—after peo-
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ple get sick and need emergency or hospital care.”338 Imposing a five-
year bar on legal permanent residents is the most fiscally damaging for 
at least two reasons: first, legal permanent residents are “citizens in 
waiting”, and the vast majority will naturalize.339 Second, even if legal 
permanent residents do not naturalize, they become eligible for federal 
health programs after five years.340 The five-year bar “hits immigrants at 
their worst, and most inappropriate time” in the United States, as they 
are statistically least likely when they first arrive to have employer-
sponsored coverage, and tend to earn less than more established immi-
grants.341 
 Furthermore, restricting lawful immigrants from state-funded 
healthcare discourages participation in government programs that are 
vital to the public interest.342 Immigrants who cannot qualify for certain 
government benefits are less likely to participate in programs for which 
they are eligible under the PRA: immunizations, crisis intervention, 
emergency shelter, and disaster relief.343 Also, many immigrants live in 
“mixed households,” containing both citizens and noncitizens.344 Par-
ticularly common are households containing noncitizen adults and citi-
zen children, and these children are adversely affected by their parents’ 
lack of access to medical care.345 Noncitizen parents are also less likely 
to enroll their citizen children, who are fully eligible for all government 
healthcare programs, out of fear and confusion over potential immigra-
tion consequences for utilization of public benefits.346 
Conclusion 
 The decisions of Massachusetts and New Jersey to terminate legal 
immigrants from their state-funded healthcare programs violate the 
Equal Protection Clause and represent bad public policy. Courts con-
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tinue to be bound by Graham v. Richardson following the enactment of 
the PRA, and must subject a state’s alienage classification to strict scru-
tiny review. Furthermore, a state cannot justify its decision to discrimi-
nate against legal immigrants by citing the scarcity of fiscal resources. 
For these reasons, the Massachusetts and New Jersey high courts should 
strike these restrictions on legal immigrants. Federal healthcare reform, 
though ambitious in scope, adopts the PRA’s restrictive immigration 
criteria and excludes most legal immigrants from Medicaid, subsidies, 
and tax credits. As a result, state-funded healthcare programs persist as 
the only option for legal immigrants who cannot afford the high cost of 
private health insurance. By providing cost-effective preventive care to 
legal immigrants, states both respect the constitutional rights of these 
“citizens in waiting,” and reduce the large deficits created by the EM-
TALA mandate. As more states compensate for the discrepancies in na-
tional reform by expanding their state-funded healthcare programs, 
they must be mindful of the legal and policy ramifications resulting 
from any potential exclusion of legal immigrants. 
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